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Victims and Self-Liability in Criminal Law:
Beyond Contributive Negligence and
Foreseeability (Without Blaming
the Victim)
Manuel Cancio Melif*
I. Introduction: A Day in the Life of Citizen C
Victims and perpetrators interact in many different ways
within criminal law. The mere fact that someone has been in-
jured in social interaction with another individual does not
mean that the law considers them "victim" and "perpetrator,"
because the phenomenological configuration of the case can
adopt multiple forms. If we consider the external appearance of
the facts of the case, the "contributions" or different behaviors of
the "victim" and "perpetrator" can adopt very different mean-
ings. In many cases it shall be clear that the actions of the vic-
tim or perpetrator lack legal and criminal relevance. Yet, in
others, the evaluation of the behaviors of the perpetrator and
victim are not unequivocal, the behavior of both actors might be
legally irrelevant or relevant. Perhaps a regular working day of
a more or less normal citizen, citizen C, can illustrate the
aforementioned.
Citizen C suffers from a serious pulmonary disease. C
wakes up one day and asks his neighbor, who knows of his dis-
ease, for a cigarette, which citizen C starts smoking. After-
wards, the bricklayer C had hired on the previous day appears
in the doorway to change some damaged tiles. C welcomes him
in and opens a window for him to go up to the roof to perform
his task. As C has noticed from the beginning, the bricklayer
hardly can perform any task; he is an old man who is only able
to make few movements. Therefore, C and his neighbor (who
* Professor of Criminal Law, Universidad Aut6noma de Madrid (UAM);
scholar, German Academic Interchange Service (DAAD), 1992/1993; Dr. Jur.,
UAM, 1997; Scholar, Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, 2002. Many thanks
are owed to Eva Carracedo (student, UAM) for her research assistance.
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was there at the request of C) help him to change the tiles that
were in poor condition, throwing them in the heap of rubble lo-
cated in C's garden. However, the neighbor has forgotten to
move away his luxurious garden furniture. Some of the tiles,
(thrown by the bricklayer, C, and his neighbor) strike them.
Later on, as he does every morning, C takes the tram to work.
The tram driver, as C states, is still very affected by the alco-
holic beverages he consumed during the previous night. In the
office a workmate, not particularly skillful, who is carrying a
huge pile of files, unluckily stumbles, and the files hit C on his
head causing a flesh wound. Despite the insistence of his
workmate, C does not want to use the first-aid kit of the com-
pany to disinfect the wound. From C's point of view, the flesh
wound is "just a small scratch." After work, C meets a friend
and both consume large quantities of alcohol, which the waiter
is refilling obligingly. Then they go to a nearby park, where the
friend offers C a certain amount of a South American narcotic,
which C gratefully accepts and consumes immediately. Subse-
quently, the friend suggests a short boat trip in the nearby
river. C agrees to take the boat trip. Together they walk to-
wards the seashore of the river. The two take a boat which had
a clear leakage, as it is half sunken. Both get into the boat and
C lies down on the plank forming the bank of the boat. Mean-
while, his friend rows to the river core. Due to the leak, the
boat sinks quickly when it reaches the strong current flowing at
the river core. C and his friend swim towards the seashore. C,
who is completely wet, wishes to get home as early as possible.
As he sees a vehicle coming closer, C suddenly jumps in the
road, believing it is a taxi cab, attempting to stop the driver by
waving his arms about. However, this driver was immersed in
a deep meditation about the concept of "Abstract Law" in Hegel
and only steps on the brakes at the last moment. C's position
was very careless; however, he could have dodged the vehicle.
Once C arrives home, C and his wife, after an initial dispute
about C's condition, start a process which ends with the con-
summation of their marriage. C suffers a particularly danger-
ous disease which may cause infection in the case of
unprotected sexual relations. This fact was conveyed to C's
wife. Nonetheless, she has forgotten it. C goes to sleep.
[Vol. 28:739
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The aforementioned events may easily have resulted in in-
juries, which may have been caused by the several intervening
parties. It seems evident that at least the concurrence of crimi-
nal behavior may have been raised in the individual, who in
each case has contributed (the "perpetrator") to the hypothetical
injuries of others. But one also has the intuitive impression
that in the narrated cases the behavior of the injured person
may have some relevance in determining whether the other per-
son has committed a type of criminal infringement.
II. Risky Joint Activities: A Starting Point
The phenomenon of dangerous activities in which someone
has somewhat intervened and later on has been injured (the
"victim") and another individual who is not harmed by the risky
behavior (the "perpetrator"), has always existed. Consequently,
these various fact patterns are the subject of study in criminal
law, both in practice and in the theoretical analysis. In this re-
spect, Silva Sdnchez has reasonably affirmed that the doctrinal
theses approaching the problem are not "a radical novelty
within the framework of our legislation, doctrine and case law,
but, at most, what happens is that these proceed to theorize, or
to 'rationalize', something that, in a different level, has been yet
taken into account, even though in an unconscious or intuitive
way."1 It has even been correctly stated (from the point of view
adopted herein) that the consideration of the victim's behavior
is not the product of the imagination separate from reality.
Otherwise, the evaluation of the victim's behavior is present in
criminal law, although in "disguise."2
However, the traditional position both of the praxis and the
theory in criminal law has been to deny the relevance of the
victim's behavior. It is said that criminal law is made to protect
those who are harmed. The input of the victim, given the re-
sponsibility of the offender, must be put aside. Particularly, in
1. See Jesfis-Maria Silva Sdnchez, La consideraci6n del comportamiento de la
victima en la teoria juridica del delito: Observaciones doctrina les y jurisprudencia
les sobre la 'victimo dogmdtica', in LA VICTIMOLOGIA 19 (Consejo General del Poder
Judicial ed., 1993). See also Georg Kleinfeller, Die Anreizung des Tdters durch den
Angegriffenen, in MUNCHENER FESTGABE FOR KARL VON BIRKMEYER 13 (1917).
2. Alon Harel, Efficiency and Fairness in Criminal Law: The Case for a Crimi-
nal Law Principle of Comparative Fault, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1181, 1226 (1994).
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the field of the dangerous activities created by several individu-
als (by whom one is finally injured), the situation in Continen-
tal Europe and the countries sharing an Anglo-Saxon legal
framework was, until recently, astonishingly proximate, taking
into account the strong differences in both groups' legal theory.3
After the resonant bang to the question of the contribution of
the victim, solemnly declaring there is no contributory negli-
gence in criminal law (unlike in tort law), the door silently
opens a little later. This legal admission of contribution is usu-
ally made through some considerations. On the one hand, it can
happen that the behavior of the victim becomes the sole rele-
vant cause, waiving all responsibility for the other individual,
or at least that this has an impact with such intensity so as to
diminish the responsibility of the perpetrator at the time of the
sentencing. On the other hand, the conduct of the victim may
have influenced the negligence of the causer, resulting in the
damage becoming unforeseeable and eliminating the responsi-
bility of the wrongdoer.
In applying these traditional solutions, when estimating
many of the events of the before mentioned C's day in criminal
law, a conclusion shall be drawn that the behavior of the victim
(provided we are dealing with a liable person) is relevant. C's
neighbor shall not be taken to court if the cigarette he gives to C
sets off a respiratory crisis causing his death. C shall not, from
a criminal law perspective, be deemed responsible for allowing
the old bricklayer to work on the roof when he suffers an acci-
dent. Neither C nor the bricklayer should be punished for
throwing the tiles onto the furniture of the neighbor and de-
stroying it. Nor should the office workmate be responsible for
scratching C if the scratch becomes infected and causes a seri-
ous injury. Finally, the waiter who served alcohol to C and his
friend should not be held responsible if the intoxication pro-
3. The image drawn by Fletcher is still viable. He characterizes Western
criminal legal thought as fractured between the Anglo-Saxon tradition and that
stemming from the European continent. This later group is heavily influenced by
German criminal law. See George P. Fletcher, Deutsche Strafrechtsdogmatik aus
ausldndischer Sicht, in DiE DEUTSCHE STRAFRECHTSWISSENSCHAFT VOR DER
JAHRTAUSENDWENDE: RoCKBESINNUNG UND AUSBLICK 235 (Albin Eser et al. eds.,
2000). The practical identity of the structures in both legal networks for these
constellations makes one think on a common historic origin previous to French
Revolution and codification.
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vokes something more than a headache. The courts on both
shores of the Atlantic Ocean (and the English Channel) enforc-
ing these traditional structures shall sentence to homicide by
negligence, but shall moderate the liability of the friend of C if
the boat sinks in the river, or that of the driver who, when driv-
ing carelessly, runs into C who suddenly jumps to the roadway.
But these courts shall find guilty, probably without restraint, if
C dies in an accident caused by the drunkenness of the tram
driver, or when consuming cocaine invited by his friend, or if
the wife of C suffers any injury from being infected.
Nonetheless, the situation is starting to change. In some
countries within the legal continental frame (Germany and
Spain, above all), both the courts and the theoretical scholars of
criminal law have begun to expressly abandon the traditional
solutions. They apply certain theories that in all cases imply to
restrain the scope of the causer's liability, conferring more im-
portance to the self-responsible conduct of the person being
injured.
In the theory of criminal law, after several influential arti-
cles, highlighted by various primary assessments of Claus
Roxin published in the beginning of the 1970s, a clear surge of
publications has been unleashed. In the 1990s and in Spain
alone, four prolific books were published on the matter.4 In the
courts, 5 there are nowadays some decisions which may not have
occurred some years ago. By way of illustration, it is worth
mentioning the following three leading cases.
In the Syringe Case (German Federal Supreme Court),6 the
defendant, a drug addict, met a friend on the day in question.
4. For references mostly of German, Spanish and Italian works, see MANUEL
CANCIO MELIA, CONDUCTA DE LA VfCTIMA E IMPUTACION OBJETIVA EN DERECHO PE-
NAL. EsTUDIo SOBRE LOS AMBITOS DE RESPONSABILIDAD DE VfCTIMA Y AUTOR EN
ACTIVIDADES ARRIESGADAS 89, 375 (2d ed. 2001) [hereinafter MANUEL CANCIO ME-
LIA, CONDUCTA DE LA VfCTIMA]. See also Manuel Cancio Melid, Victim Behavior
and Offender Liability: A European Perspective, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 513, 515
(2004) [hereinafter Manuel Cancio Melid, Victim Behavior and Offender Liability].
5. For case references in Spanish, German, Swiss, British, Italian and United
States courts, see MANUEL CANCIO MELIA, CONDUCTA DE LA VfCTIMA, supra note 4,
at 24, 96, 147, 179.
6. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] 1984, 32 Ent-
scheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Strafgericht [BGHSt] 262-267 (F.R.G.).
See also Manuel Cancio Melid, Victim Behavior and Offender Liability, supra note
4, at 515 n.9 (2004) (referencing several commentaries on the decision).
7432008]
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This friend, who was also addicted to drugs, consumed with the
defendant a certain amount of heroin in the possession of the
latter. To this purpose the friend asked the defendant to get
some syringes, as the friend was a well-known consumer of nar-
cotics and could not possibly obtain them. Once the defendant
obtained the syringes, they both consumed the heroine. After
injecting the heroine, both lost consciousness. When a doctor
arrived, the friend had died due to a cardio-respiratory arrest
produced by the injection.7
The Juvenile Court sentenced the defendant to a crime
against public health and homicide by negligence, declaring
that by obtaining the syringes the defendant had contributed a
condition for the death of his friend. The German Federal Su-
preme Court (GFSC) reversed the decision, holding that irre-
spective of the evidence of a causal relationship and
foreseeability, the behavior of the defendant only established a
mode of participation in a dangerous, self-responsible self-en-
dangerment. Whether or not the act was negligent, the defen-
dant must not be punishable in absence of the typified main
matter of fact. In any event, according to the GFSC, punishabil-
ity may arise in these assumptions from the time when the par-
ticipant apprehends the risk better than the one who puts
himself under risk because he has a deeper knowledge on the
subject matter. However, there was no evidence of these facts
when applied in the case.8
In the Vehicle Jump Case (Spanish Supreme Court),9 the
defendant had picked up the victim, who was hitch-hiking.
Once the victim stepped into the car, the accused asked the vic-
tim to give him the money he had. The accused then asked for
the watch the hitchhiker was wearing, threatening the hitch-
hiker with the use of a pocket knife he stated he had (although
this fact was not proven). Faced with this kind greeting, the
hitchhiker asked the defendant to stop the vehicle and allow
him to remove the watch, proclaiming (while opening the door
of the car) that he would otherwise throw himself out of the car
7. Syringe Case, BGH 1984, 32 BHGSt 262-67.
8. Id.
9. STS, Feb. 26, 2000. See also 4 REVISTA DE DERECHO Y PROCESO PENAL 1
(2000).
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at full speed. After the defendant declined to stop, the victim
threw himself off the car, suffering injuries due to the impact.10
The trial court convicted the accused of attempted robbery
and for the injuries suffered by the victim. The Supreme Court
reversed the conviction on the last charge, holding that the
charge did not apply because the victim, in deciding to jump out
of the moving car, had made an incorrect weighting of the goods
at stake (the property of the watch versus the life or physical
integrity at risk due to the jump). In the court's opinion, these
facts excluded the possibility of charging the perpetrator with
injuring the victim.'1
In the Bridge Case'2 (Supreme Court of Peri), the defen-
dant had organized a concert over a promenade located next to
a river. Over the river there was a home-made suspension
bridge, built with ropes and small bits of wood. To carry out the
party, the indicted asked for a prior authorization from the
mayor's office of the sector. The party also had a police support
unit. The festival elapsed with normality along the day. How-
ever, at nightfall a group of forty drunken people, motivated by
the passion of the party, started to dance over the bridge. The
bridge collapsed causing all of those on the bridge to fall into the
water. Two people drowned, while the other thirty-eight suf-
fered injuries.13
The trial court convicted the organizer of the party for neg-
ligent homicide. The court determined that the organizer failed
to uphold his duty in adopting the necessary care to avoid the
result. The Supreme Court, on the contrary, acquitted the de-
fendant from criminal liability basing its reasoning, among
other grounds, on the notion that a suspension bridge is an ac-
cess way to the traffic of persons and not a dance platform. The
victims, in choosing to dance on the suspension bridge, created
their own risk and were to accept the consequences of their
actions. 14
10. Vehicle Jump Case, STS.
11. Id.
12. STSJ, Apr. 13, 1998 (4288-97).
13. Id.
14. Id. See also MANUEL CANCIO MELA, CONDUCTA DE LA VfCImA, supra note
2008] 745
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It appears that a discussion of this question is also starting
to take place in the United States. In the last few years, it has
been highlighted by, on one hand, the proposal of Alon Harel, 15
and, on the other hand, the deep, general analysis of Vera
Bergelson. 16 Even though the scope of both approaches is very
different, 7 they both share the opinion that the victim's behav-
ior should be taken into consideration.
Within the context of the vivid attention paid by the theory
in the field of Civil Law to the problem of the behavior of the
victim in criminal law in the last years, I have formulated in
several articles a proposal for the treatment in question on the
basis of the principle of self-liability, 8 a proposal I have tried to
synthesize on basic principles for the North American discus-
sion in another publication.' 9 In the present paper, I shall try to
refer to what is still the status quo of criminal law in the United
States and what it was not long ago in the continental field,
highlighting why the traditional view does not seem to work
smoothly on the problem, particularly in the approaches based
on causation. 20 It may be expected that the analysis shows the
insufficiency of these instruments and, therewith, the need of a
15. Harel, supra note 2, at 1181-82.
16. See Vera Bergelson, Victims and Perpetrators: An Argument for Compara-
tive Liability in Criminal Law, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 385 (2005). See also Heidi M.
Hurd, Blaming the Victim: A Response to the Proposal That Criminal Law Recog-
nize a General Defense of Contributory Responsibility, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 503
(2005).
17. Harel bases his proposal on efficiency consideration, close to what has
been called the "victim-dogmatic hypothesis." See Harel, supra note 2. This view
is supported by Bernd Schuinemann and others who advance the continental view
of criminal legal theory. See MANUEL CANCIO MELIA, CONDUCTA DE LA VfCTIMA,
supra note 4, at 237, 242, 253, 259 (critiquing the doctrine and discussing Harel's
work). Bergelson builds a normative approach based on the "principle of condition-
ality of rights," according to which the behavior of the victim has influence on the
liability of the doer. Bergelson, supra note 16, at 390.
18. See MANUEL CANCIO MELIA, CONDUCTA DE LA VfCTIMA, supra note 4;. MA-
NUEL CANCIO MELIA, LA EXCLUSION DE LA TIPICIDAD POR LA RESPONSABILIDAD DE LA
VfCTIMA (1998); Manuel Cancio Melid, Reflexiones sobre la 'victimodogmcitica' en la
teoria del delito, 25 Revista Brasileira de Ci~ncias Criminais 23 (1999); Manuel
Cancio MeliA, Opferverhalten und objektive Zurechnung, 111 ZSTW 357 (1999).
19. See Manuel Cancio MeliA, Victim Behavior and Offender Liability, supra
note 4.
20. See infra Part III.
746 [Vol. 28:739
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normative, comprehensive approach, whose basic guidelines I
shall present.21
Irrespective of sharing the positions adopted within the
framework of the current deliberations, I hope this article shall
be a humble contribution to a dialogue among the academic
scholars of the United States and the legal continental field.
This is specifically necessary in a period in which the real inter-
nationalization of criminal law and the political communication
on crime and criminal law goes boldly forward, and, of course, it
is not waiting for the theoretical analysis.22 It is specifically
needful at this time when the question of the victim has aroused
a decisive importance in criminal legislative politics within the
Western countries, and in which the use and abuse of the figure
of the victim is a day-to-day debate on both shores of the Atlan-
tic Ocean and is used as a spearhead2 for what has been called
"criminal law for enemies."24 In this matter, we have to take
into account the idea that certain positions in the theory of the
criminal law which imply blaming the victim have a particu-
larly intense criminal charge.
III. Causation: Contributory Negligence and
Concurrent Negligence
A. "Concurrent Negligence" and Causation in a Continental
System: Spanish Jurisdiction
The case law praxis of the Spanish Supreme Court in the
estimation of the victim's behavior contributing to his injuries
has developed its own doctrine, called "concurrent negligence"
or "contributory negligence." This theory was used for a long
period of time (starting in 1990, it began to be replaced by other
21. See infra Part IV.
22. See Manuel Cancio Melin, Internationalisierung der Kriminalpolitik:
tiberlegungen zum strafrechtlichen Kampf gegen den Terrorismus, in STRAFRECHT
UND WIRTSCHAFTSSTRAFRECHT: DOGMATIK, RECHTSVERGLEICH, RECHTSTATSACHEN
1513 (Ulrich Sieber et al. eds., 2008).
23. See, e.g., MARKUS D. DUBBER, VICTIMS IN THE WAR ON CRIME: THE USE AND
ABUSE OF VICTIMS' RIGHTS (2002); SILVA SAi'~cHEz, LA EXPANSION DEL DERECHO PE-
NAL: POLTICA CRIMINAL EN LAS SOCIEDADES POSTINDUSTRIALES 52 (2001).
24. See GONTHER JAKOBS & MANUEL CANCIO MELIA, DERECHO PENAL DEL
ENEMIGO (2006) (discussing a wide range of ideas from scholars of many countries
on the topic of "criminal law for enemies"). See also 2 EL DIsCURSO PENAL DE LA
EXCLUSION (Manuel Cancio Melid & Carlos G6mez-Jara eds., 2006).
20081 747
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theoretical structures). In the following pages, I shall try to
outline the basic elements of this legal guideline and then sub-
mit it to a brief test.
Under the flag of the affirmation that there is no compensa-
tion for negligence in criminal law, 25 the Spanish Supreme
Court refused for a long time to recognize, at least from an open
view, any influence to the intervention of the victim in the gene-
sis of risk.26 However, under the appearance of a total rejection
for any other consideration tending to mitigate the liability of
the doer pursuant to the intervention of the victim in the gene-
sis of the risk, there was a praxis in the case law that involved
the attribution of the behavioral relevance in the victim at the
time of the establishment of the legal and criminal liability of
the perpetrator. Under this legal approach, the subject matter
of causality is located under the heading of the "contributory
negligence" or the "concurrent negligence" doctrine. As the court
stated:
It is a repeated doctrine of this Court that whether the compensa-
tion for negligence is not of application in the criminal law as the
private law of the compensation of obligations, it is lawful and
obliged to value the concurrent behaviors of all the main charac-
ters of the facts, included the proper victim .... 27
According to the Spanish Supreme Court, it is necessary to
determine, through a comparative weighting in the causal axis,
whether any of the behaviors has had "prevailing efficiency,
analogous or in inferiority, well understood that these shall be
considered primary or prevailing in the legal field those reputed
truly as genuine or driving units in the beginning of the events,
having a secondary nature those merely in favour thereof
...",28 In this sense, it is understood that to apply this reason-
ing, the different concurrent causes have to be personalized and
applied with the general criteria of experience. Due to this eval-
uation, it was possible that the responsibility of the other inter-
vening individual was diminished and, in some cases, even
completely disappeared.
25. Hurd, supra note 16, at 503 (calling these expressions "mantras").
26. See MANUEL CANCIO MELIA, CONDUCTA DE LA VIcTIMA, supra note 4, at 95.
27. STS, Dec. 26, 1989.
28. STS, Feb. 25, 1991.
[Vol. 28:739748
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B. Causation and Contribution of the Victim in the Anglo-
Saxon Field
From the continental perspective, and from my point of
view, in the Anglo-Saxon criminal law there are legal theories
that are very close to the aforementioned approach. Following
this line, it can be said schematically that, on the one hand, any
relevance of the doctrines similar to the continental "compensa-
tion for negligence," known as "contributory negligence" and
"contributory fault" in tort law, 29 are refuted. In legal words:
Contributory negligence is not ordinarily available as a defense in
a criminal prosecution; it cannot purge an act otherwise constitut-
ing a public offense of its criminal character. Specifically, one
who is guilty of criminal negligence is not relieved from criminal
responsibility by the contributory negligence of the person injured
or killed.30
Similarly, "contributory negligence on the part of the person
killed, although sufficient to bar a civil action ... does not re-
lieve the latter from criminal responsibility for having caused
the death."31
However, the evolution of doctrine and case law32 has led to
a valuation carried out in the causation axis of the victim's be-
havior, arguing that this may turn the initial injury in a "too
much remote cause."33 In this sense, it is affirmed in some doc-
trinal areas that a particular "voluntary" behavior of the victim
may block the causation relationship.34 It has also been argued
that whether the behavior of the victim is "abnormal" or "not
reasonable," it is the only cause 35 of the damage.36 However,
29. Meanwhile by virtue of the doctrine of contributory negligence, the com-
pensation to the aggrieved individual can be reduced when he has behaved with
negligence. The doctrine of the comparative fault, on the other hand, measures the
liability of the wrong-doer in cases of careless conduct of the injured party. See,
e.g., H. L. A. HART & M. A. HONORI , CAUSATION IN THE LAw 190 (1973); Harel,
supra note 2, at 1191-92 (concerning American law).
30. 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 470 (2008).
31. 40 AM. JUR. 2D Homicide § 107 (2008).
32. See, e.g., Glanville Williams, Causation in Homicide, 3 CRIM. L. REV. 429,
510 (1957) (discussing the evolution of the causation doctrine in this field in the
Anglo-Saxon doctrine and case law).
33. Id. at 514.
34. See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 208 (2006).
35. 40 AM. JuR. 2D Homicide § 107 (2008) ("In some cases, the conduct of the
decedent is regarded as material to the extent that it bears upon the question
2008] 749
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from the author's point of view, the victim's behavior should
never be the "direct cause."37
The acceptance of these considerations in the legal praxis
seems to have been quite unequal. It is worth mentioning that
the courts of the United States are more favorable to this trend.
This is exemplified in the case of State v. Preslar.38
In Preslar, a woman, after having been battered by her hus-
band, left the marital home. Before her arrival to her father's
home, where she would have been welcomed, she decided to
spend the night outdoors and consequently froze to death. The
court found that the woman's voluntary behavior broke the cau-
sation relationship. 39
whether, und all the circumstances of the case, the defendant was negligent, or
whether the defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of the death."). "The
contributory negligence of a victim is not a defense to vehicular homicide, absent a
showing that the victim's conduct was an independent intervening cause of death,
i.e., one which the defendant could not foresee and which is more than a contribut-
ing cause of the injury." COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-106 (1)(b) (emphasis added).
See also People v. McAfee, 104 P.3d 226, 230 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004). The Court in
the New Zealand case, R. v. Storey (1931), falls within this principle, in the argu-
ment of the relevance of a careless conduct of the victim after a traffic accident
caused by the negligent action of the doer. See MANUEL CANCIO MELL&, CONDUCTA
DE LA ViCTIMA, supra note 4, at 106, 117, 334; RUPERT CROSS & PHILIP ASTERLEY
JONES, AN INTRODUCTION TO CRIMINAL LAw 123 (1968); HART & HONORt, supra
note 29, at 309, 319, 406 (suggesting a distinction between gross and ordinary neg-
ligence by the victim).
36. See HART & HONORt, supra note 29, at 318, and JOHN SMITH & BRIAN
HOGAN, CRIMINAL LAW 50 (10th ed. 2002), for discussions in which this argument
was not taken into account and thus supporting the idea of holding a defendant
totally liable for causing a wound that the victim subsequently neglects to care for.
37. See Veldzquez v. State, 561 So. 2d 347 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Penn-
sylvania v. Root, 170 A.2d 310 (Pa. 1961) quoted in MARKUS D. DUBBER & MARK G.
KELMAN, AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAw: CASES, STATUTES, AND COMMENTS 421 (2005).
In Root, the victim had challenged the accused to a car race in a public roadway.
During the race, the victim, trying to overtake the defendant, crashed into an on-
coming truck. The victim died in the crash. Root, 170 A.2d at 573. The court held
that due to the victim's negligence, "the defendant's reckless conduct was not a
sufficiently direct cause" of the victim's death. Id. at 580. See also Commonwealth
v. Uhrinek, 544 A.2d. 947, 952 (Pa. 1988) (holding that "evidence of a deceased
pedestrian's intoxication is admissible in a homicide by vehicle prosecution, if rele-
vant to the defendant's theory of the cause of the accident.... ."); DRESSLER, supra
note 34, at 208; Vivian S. McCardell, Victim's Intoxication in Vehicular Homicide,
62 TEMP. L. REV. 784 (1989).
38. 48 N.C. 421 (1856). See, e.g., DRESSLER, supra note 34, at 207.
39. Id. See HART & HONOP9, supra note 29, at 293, 324; McCardell, supra
note 37.
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This theory has also come to exclude the responsibility of
the doer in assumptions in which there are simultaneous be-
haviors of victim and doer, such as in cases of unlawful car
races.40 On the other hand, British courts dealing with this
same issue of the causation relationship seem to be more re-
strictive, sometimes reaching decisions which seem difficult to
understand from the continental perspective.
For example, in the very well-known 1975 British case R. v.
Blaue, a young woman died of a stab wound as she refused to
have a blood transfusion because she was a Jehovah's Witness.
The court declared that there was no interruption of the causal
relation due to the rule of "take the victim as you find her,"
whose content may be summarized as "the "abnormal pattern
(obviously not as it is understood regularly, but in its broadest
sense, as religious beliefs are comprised therein) of the victim
does not interrupt the causal relationship."41
On the same line, it is worth mentioning the recent case R.
v. Dear.42 In Dear, the defendant injured the victim with a
bladed weapon. Before the defendant's appeal on the basis that
the victim had "interrupted the causal link" by reopening his
wounds or not taking care to avoid the bleeding as the wounds
opened spontaneously, the Court held that the cause of the
death was the bleeding of the artery sectioned by the perpetra-
tor, irrespective of the reappearance or the continuation of the
bleeding caused willfully by the victim. 43
This matter is sometimes raised in both legal circles from
the subjective point of view ex ante of the causer, arguing that
the later behavior of the victim was not "predictable." Thus,
pursuant to the common law system, the defendant lacked
mens rea, or, in continental terms, negligence or intention.44 In
any event, it is necessary to consider that the Anglo-Saxon doc-
trine tradition is alien to the categorical modem continental
separation between objective-material (material causation),
40. See sources cited supra note 37.
41. See DRESSLER, supra note 34, at 208 n.63 (for a critique of this position);
ALAN NORRIE, CRIME, REASON AND HISTORY: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO CRIMI-
NAL LAw 145 (1993); SMITH & HOGAN, supra note 36, at 50.
42. See SMITH & HOGAN, supra note 36.
43. See id.
44. See MANUEL CANCIO MELIA, CONDUCTA DE LA VfCTIMA, supra note 4, at
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normative ("objective imputation") and subjective issues (fore-
seeability). Therefore, under the heading of "causation" there
are also carried out some positions which in the continental cur-
rent are considered of subjective nature and are deemed alien to
that question.45 As Robinson puts it:
In contrast to the scientific inquiry of the factual cause require-
ment, the proximate (legal) cause requirement presents essen-
tially a normative inquiry. Deciding whether a result is "too
remote or accidental in its occurrence" or "too dependent on an-
other's volitional act" obviously calls for an exercise of intuitive
judgement. The inquiry cannot be resolved by examining the
facts more closely or having scientific experts analyze the
situation.46
C. Critique: Causation, Equity and "Hidden Normativity"
The development of this doctrinal case law, under the sign
of "causation," gives way to constraining arguments of liability
on the grounds of material reasons of normative nature: the
causation axis is approached only from the nominal perspective.
In fact, nowadays it is a unanimous opinion in continental the-
ory and practice that the approach to these matters within the
field of causation is wrong. Causation exists or does not exist.
It is a matter of empirical evidence, and it does not deal with
assessed normative weights.47 Therefore, a seemingly technical
and legal cover is offered on the basis of equity.
It is this tacit normative base which allows one to "solve"
the enigma or, rather, to understand the true scope of how the
"negligence" of both victim and causer can "be concurrent in
causation." This terminology does not mean in any way any-
thing but a behavior attributable to the victim, which may give
rise to the influence of this behavior on the decisions of criminal
courts. Only this implied normative assessment 48 and not the
literality of the Spanish Supreme Court doctrine, the "powerful"
45. See HART & HONORP, supra note 29, at 385.
46. PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW: CASE STUDIES & CONTROVERSIES 301-
02 (2005) (emphasis added) (underlining the vagueness of these standards). See
also FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTs OF CRIMINAL LAw 64, 71 (1998).
47. See MANUEL CANCIO MELA, CONDUCTA DE LA VfCTIMA, supra note 4, at
106, 126.
48. FLETCHER, supra note 46, at 70-71 (discussing "Ideology and Causation").
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or "prevailing" causes, etc., is what allows the Spanish Supreme
Court and United States courts to discriminate, quite matter-of-
factly, those cases in which the "concurrence of negligence" is of
application from other assumptions in which there is a neces-
sary and relevant cooperation of the victim, with a deep "causal
influence," as the case may be. But because the behavior of the
victim is not attributable, there is no "negligence" of the victim.
It is exactly this underlying normative nature which makes
these approaches become something different than a mere "bal-
ance" of negligences within the framework of culpability49 and,
at the same time, the reason of the location of the concurrence
of negligences within the field of causation. It is also a "hidden
normativity" which explains the astonishing coincidences found
in the Anglo-Saxon doctrine concerning the approach of the
Spanish Supreme Court.
Falling within this principle, it is not a coincidence that the
Spanish Supreme Court has developed the doctrine of the con-
currence of negligence in line with the behavior of the victim: it
involves the implied acknowledgement of a modality from the
normative axis which should correspond to the intervention of
that person who contributes to the damage of its own goods.
This has even more relevance if we bear in mind that the case
law structure is not only applied to the assumptions in which
there is a mere "confluence" of risk-generating conducts in the
harmful result, but also to those others in which the victim and
doer jointly configure the behavioral pattern which lastly dam-
ages the first. In any event, it has to be highlighted with a spe-
cial interest the idea of the "allotment" of liabilities underlying
in the statement that not only in assumptions of a complete dis-
charge of the agent, but also to cases of "degradation" in negli-
gence. As it seems difficult to establish some legal grounds on
how the concurrence of the negligent behavior of one of the indi-
viduals may have an impact on the "negligence" of the other in-
tervening party, from the material view, some existing
assumptions are stated in which the behavior of the victim may
49. See Ulfrid Neuman, Die Stellung des Opfers im Strafrecht, in STRAFRECHT-
SPOLITIK: BEDINGUNGEN DER STRAFRECHTSREFORM, 230 (Winfried Hassemer ed.,
1987).
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mitigate the responsibility of the doer, but without excluding it
at all. 50
The modern scientific doctrine, nonetheless, is more fo-
cused on a pattern which mainly tries to exclude or state liabil-
ity. However, there exists a specific set of assumptions in which
this seeming "allotment" of liabilities solution is correctly
reached. Thus, there are cases in which one cannot state that it
is exclusively one of the intervening parties (victim or author)
that is responsible for the produced damage. In this regard, it
may be thought that from the view of the physical consequences
concerning this subject matter, these legal solutions should be
positively evaluated, at least with respect to a specific set of
cases.
We can conclude this brief essay of the traditional ap-
proaches with the confirmation that what is forbidden in the
main entrance of the home is permitted at the back door: we
must also bear in mind the victim's behavior to mitigate or ex-
clude the wrongfulness of the causer's behavior. As it seems ob-
vious, such a doctrine does not talk about its actions and
therefore affects its legal safety: it should be replaced by a more
coherent theory. Next, I offer in a short thesis a proposal to this
aim.
IV. A Proposal: The Imputation to the Victim's Liability
Domain on the Basis of the Self-liability Principle
1. Foundations: the Principle of Self-Liability
Personal freedom is a foundational structure in our socie-
ties; it implies the right of every citizen to develop his or her
personality freely. This right cannot be understood outside a
system that acknowledges citizens as autonomous individuals.
In addition to the adjudication of each individual's autonomy, a
special place should be assigned to the person whose interests
are protected by criminal law. Given, first, that criminal law
imposes no restrictions on the sacrifice of such interests by their
owner, and second, that the acts of third parties in self-endan-
gering or self-harming activities are only incriminated in excep-
tional circumstances (as it is the case in most countries with
50. See MANUEL CANCIO MELIA, CONDUCTA DE LA VfCTIMA, supra note 4, at
130, 345.
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aiding a suicide), then it is up to the owner of those interests to
behave in such manner that his own interests are eventually
put at risk. The consequence of such freedom is that this person
should assume, in a preferential way, the negative outcome of
his own behavior. The special link that binds the person with
his or her own interests is more intense than any link to the
interests of others and implies a dynamic connection between
the freedom to act and liability for the outcome of one's acts.
The opposite would mean denying this person's organizational
freedom and would impose on the other people a sort of "guard-
ian" duty that is not specifically defined in the law and there-
fore does not exist.
The self-liability principle consists in acknowledging free-
dom to organize one's own interests and, in correspondence with
it, in attributing a "preferential" liability to the person whose
interests are involved.5 1 Which outlines can be excerpted from
the duality autonomy/liability for the criminal law theory and
practice? Let me answer not with many case studies, but with a
few abstract theses.
2. Unilateral Approaches Do Not Work
The vast majority of legal commentators in continental dis-
cussion try to solve the problem of victim behavior with the help
of the institution of consent. This approach does not lead to sat-
isfactory results. The application of the institution of consent
(we must look for a general solution, fitting also to endanger-
ment offenses, not only to result offenses), even by the "minor
consent" implied in "assumption of risk" schemes, fails due to
the practical impossibility of proving consent and to the denatu-
ralization of the institution itself to which such deformations
lead. This is just a consequence of the idea that mental diagno-
sis cannot be the decisive element in solving the problem, and
this affects all theoretical proposals embracing any kind of prin-
ciple of consent as their basic element. It only leads to a partial
image of the whole spectrum of consequences which may be
caused by victim behavior. Criminal law imputation can by no
means solely take into consideration one of the conscious per-
51. See MANUEL CANClO MELIA, CONDUCTA DE LA VICTIMA, supra note 4, at
261; Manuel Cancio MeliA, Victim Behavior and Offender Liability, supra note 4,
at 529.
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spectives. A definition of the offender's liability domain has to
be reached, and this definition cannot depend simply on what
the victim knows or doesn't know, whether she consents or
not.52
Another frequent approach discussed recently in Europe
distinguishes between (1) "self-endangering" (i.e., putting one-
self at risk), which is, following this construction, not subject to
punishment, and (2) "endangering someone else" (i.e., putting
others at risk), which would deserve punishment. This distinc-
tion has become common ground in the subject not only in Ger-
many, but also in other countries. An analysis of both theory
and practice of this distinction approach reveals that the whole
classification is to be called into question, and that the distinc-
tion becomes too often a mere topos and fails to provide ade-
quate solutions. In the end, classifying the event as "self-
endangering" or as "endangering someone else" should not pre-
judge the solution.5 3
Finally, points of view introducing the "deserving protec-
tion" idea through the so-called "victimological principle" also
have to be rejected. The intent to develop a "victimological per-
spective" in the legal doctrine has serious inconveniences.
Some argue that it could open the door to an inversion of the
penal system or "blaming the victim." This is the consequence
of the lack of an adequate normative basis. It is not possible to
obtain normative solutions in criminal law just on the ground of
factual possibilities of self-protection. The mere invocation of
the victimological doctrine perspective cannot solve the problem
of the influence of victim behavior within the criminal imputa-
tion system. We may argue that before the denomination was
even invented, a "victimological" doctrine already existed in dif-
ferent institutions of the offense theory. Putting it differently,
52. See MANUEL CANCIO MELIA, CONDUCTA DE LA VICTIMA, supra note 4, at
147, 164, 175; Manuel Cancio Melii, Victim Behavior and Offender Liability, supra
note 4, at 522.
53. See MANUEL CANCIO MELIA, CONDUCTA DE LA VICTIMA, supra note 4, at
179, 207; Manuel Cancio Melid, Victim Behavior and Offender Liability, supra
note 4, at 522-24 (for a critique). For a theory similar to the endangerment solu-
tion, see DUBBER & KELMAN, supra note 37, at 422.
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it is not necessary to create a special victim doctrine; the ex-
isting doctrine should be able to solve the problem.54
3. The Imputation to the Victim's Liability Domain
Risky activities should be imputed to the victim's liability
domain whenever (1) the action remains within the domain of
what was organized jointly by victim and offender, (2) the vic-
tim's behavior was not instrumentalized by the offender (i.e., he
did not take advantage of the victim's lack of sufficient knowl-
edge to be considered self-liable), and (3) the offender does not
have a specific duty to protect the victim's interests.55
Once the mutual activity of offender and victim is defined,
the act should be imputed, at first, to the victim's liability do-
main. The reason for this is that the victim's sphere of auton-
omy results in a preferential harm allocation to his own liability
domain. Taking into account the preferential nature of victim
liability, harm allocation cannot follow the same guidelines that
determine different degrees of liability for principals and acces-
sories due to the commission of an offense against a third party.
Once it is stated that the risky activity is a consequence of the
interaction between victim and offender, the joint activity can-
not be fragmented into contributions of greater or lesser range
depending on either.56
Once the joint performance of victim and offender is de-
fined, the imputation of that performance to the victim's liabil-
ity domain can be framed in objective terms. This is due to a
special feature in this type of case: the interaction between of-
fender and victim. Victim and offender create the risk together.
From this perspective, there is no use in questioning the of-
fender's or the victim's thought processes. Thus, the horizon
that is relevant to confirm or deny criminal liability of the per-
petrator is given by the joint performance (i.e., through an ob-
54. See MANUEL CAN¢CO MELIA, CONDUCTA DE LA VICTIMA, supra note 4, at
221, 242; Manuel Cancio Melid, Victim Behavior and Offender Liability, supra
note 4, at 526-27.
55. See MANUEL CANCIO MELIA, CONDUCTA DE LA VfcTiMA, supra note 4, at
284; Manuel Cancio MeliA, Victim Behavior and Offender Liability, supra note 4,
at 532.
56. See MANUEL CANCIO MELIA, CONDUCTA DE LA VICTIMA, supra note 4, at
287; Manuel Cancio MeliA, Victim Behavior and Offender Liability, supra note 4,
at 533.
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jective perspective). Why? Because according to the interactive
structure of these cases, these events can be properly classified
if, and only if, the common perspective of victim and offender is
introduced: just because the victim decides to go ahead regard-
less of a risk, we may not conclude that the other person
behaves unlawfully.57
The concept of joint organization must not hide a "versari
in interactio" for the victim (i.e., a kind of "strict liability" or
"versari in re illicita"). It is not a process of "blaming the vic-
tim." Of course, a joint organization does not exist when we are
dealing with merely statistical risks, even if these are very high
and known to the victim. A person who goes for a walk in a
forest in which it is commonly known that a gang of poachers
use their shot-guns with great negligence should not assume
the risk of a firearm wound. A woman does not consent to rape
if she invites a man, known for his incorrect behavior, for din-
ner. In all these cases there is no jointly organized risk activity.
Nor is there when the offender's behavior introduces an addi-
tional element into the common context or when the situation
itself somehow contains a risk factor that does not belong to the
joint organization. Finally, we cannot consider that the harm is
within the victim's liability domain whenever the joint organi-
zation has a task distribution that implies controlling certain
risk elements where one of those elements harms the victim. 58
Let me finish these reflections by coming back to our citizen
C, possible perpetrator and victim of different offenses (if the
different risks were to end up badly). From my point of view, all
his activities on day X are irrelevant. There is no criminal
wrongfulness in the risks he sets. Nor does he suffer jointly
with the other intervenists. This statement might hopefully
summarize our debate.
57. See MANUEL CANCIO MELL, CONDUCTA DE LA VfCTIMA, supra note 4, at
289; Manuel Cancio MeliA, Victim Behavior and Offender Liability, supra note 4,
at 535.
58. See MANUEL CANCIO MELL, CONDUCTA DE LA VICTIMA, supra note 4, at
292, 310; Manuel Cancio MeliA, Victim Behavior and Offender Liability, supra
note 4, at 539.
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